Type Chapter in book. Language en. ISBN Collections Faculty of Social Sciences. Related items Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject. Tsemo, Victor In political philosophy, power and responsibility are known to be two sides of the same coin. Yet surprisingly, corporate political power has not been strongly featured in the long-standing debate surrounding Corporate Social Responsibility CSR , despite the parallel debate on the influence of business in policy-making.
This thesis adds to the CSR debate by investigating the processes and mechanisms by which CSR activities contribute to the power of the firm in the political arena, in the context of the British construction industry. Drawing on the literature on power, political activity and extended corporate citizenship, a conceptual model of the relationship between CSR and CPP was developed. Using a hybrid constructivist-realism epistemology and a processbased analysis, three exploratory case studies were carried out in construction companies operating in the UK.
Data were collected through archival research and semi-structured interviews, and analysed by means of within and cross-case analyses. The results revealed that the political environment of the firm was analogous to a marketplace where companies traded political goods with policy-makers. CSR activities produced four political goods, namely public image, technical expertise, social capital and indebtedness, which were identified as the mechanisms by which CSR contributed to CPP. The impacts of CSR activities on CPP were three-fold: CSR strengthened the privileged structural position of companies; helped them gain easier access to policy-makers; and this privileged access gave companies more opportunities to influence regulatory outcomes.
There are also implications for practice. CSR activities are velvet curtains that hide the operationalisation of political power. The social and political implications call for the attention of government officials who favour a neoliberal doctrine for the promotion of CSR to business. Dabor, Igho Lordson This thesis argues that the twin concept of separate personality and limited liability from its historical beginnings, has entrenched corporate irresponsibility.
It assesses the role that these concepts have played in tackling corporate irresponsibility from their historical origins to the present day, commenting on the lessons learnt. Global Governance and the Quest for Justice: v. Spara som favorit. Skickas inom vardagar. This book - one in the four-volume set, Global Governance and the Quest for Justice - focuses on human rights in the context of 'globalisation' together with the principle of 'respect for human rights and human dignity' viewed as one of the foundational commitments of a legitimate scheme of global governance.
The interests of others affected by trade, such as the users of goods and services, may be taken into account but will of necessity be secondary in order of importance as compared with producer interests. Insofar as the organisation does pay attention to this damage, says the functionalist, it must do so in a way that is subordinate to its primary mission of market integration.
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Directions of Adjustment Among Basic Rights The functionalist way of fixing priorities among institutional objectives, and its way of identifying those to whom primary responsibility is owed, lead inexorably to the relegation of certain basic rights to a collateral role.
This is not, once again, because these rights are thought to have less intrinsic value, but simply because of the structure of the situation. If you begin with a functional outlook, the rest follows.
What are Economic, Social and Cultural rights?
It does no good to berate the functionalist for failing to take rights seriously. She will reply, hand on heart, that she does. She is not willing to sacrifice all basic rights to the pursuit of institutional goals per se. She is, for example, willing to see the right of a local population to a safe envi- ronment take ultimate precedence over the right to trade. At the same time, however, she systematically looks for a mode of exercising that right that will do the least to prejudice other basic rights which run with the grain of institutional goals. Varying Strengths of a Functional Position The most austere of functional outlooks often bars human rights concerns altogether.
This is in Article 24 of the Covenant itself, which says that nothing in the Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the constitutions of the specialized agencies which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the Covenant.
This in turn fixes the boundary to its mission. The more moderate species of functional approach moves one step closer to basic rights. We can see this version in the WTO administered trade treaties already mentioned. Basic rights appear to receive their due respect, but practice can fall well short of what we normally think of as required.
Where the functionalists claim that shared, general objectives can guide the organisa- tion via its pursuit of its special goals, civic principles turn that priority around. The special objectives fall into place as a particular way of fulfilling a larger mandate, and the latter may sometimes call for compromises in the pursuit of the former. These are compromises that may be far stronger than moderate functionalism allows. It would no longer temper its commitment to such a balance by having to find and pursue a version of these general objectives that did least damage to the special imperative to integrate markets.
As before, there are some concrete implications of this outlook.
The Scope of Responsibility Civic principles widen considerably the balance and range of institution- al responsibility. It is a range that enlarges the accountability of the organisation for the effects of its policies, and it is a balance that places all of those affected on a par.
The result brings the responsibilities of the non-state actor in some ways closer to those of the state itself, though vital differences remain. Thus, where states open their markets each is responsible for the effects of that decision on users, producers, and third parties. There is no legitimate basis for giving any one of these interests automatic priority over the other. From a civic perspective, the powerful non-state actor should hold in equal balance the interests of the same range of individuals: they are all affected by what it does, and none should find in advance that they take second place.
There is, on civic principles, a quality of reversibility about these adjustments between competing basic rights. To illustrate this feature from another domain, consider the right to life as it competes with the right to freedom of movement. Preservation of life is ultimately more important than is the interest in freedom of movement along the highway. But it is not true that each and every level of risk of death is more important to prevent than is any given level of freedom of movement.
Assume that the reduction is 10, deaths in a given population for every mile of reduction between and 90 mph; from 50 to 40 mph; from 40 to 20 mph, and 10 between 20 and 10 mph. Even though the preservation of life is ultimately more important than is freedom of movement along the highway, it does not follow that the right to freedom of movement must always be adjusted downwards so as to have the least impact on the death rate.
At a certain point a polity may, and sometimes must, reverse the direction of compro- mise. In this example, it must at a certain point limit the attention paid to the risk of death in favor of the right to freedom of movement, however clearly a certain number of deaths is linked to a further reduction in speed. This point should help us to pin down further what is involved in mov- ing a basic right away from a collateral position towards being a central concern of an institution.
A right plays such a central role if it forms part of a set, each one of which sometimes serves as the benchmark against which the exercise of another is adjusted. If there is to be any prospect of combining civic principles with the imperatives of specialized organisa- tions in civil society, then it is this capacity for mutual and reversible adjustment among rights that is crucial: it is the domain in which that marriage must succeed in practical terms. It is tempting to think that civic balances underpin the work of the state, but not that of the species of specialised organisation we are concerned with here.
Many think that it undermines the very nature of the WTO to think of holding it, like the state, responsi- ble for damage to the full range of human rights. We seem to be faced with an insurmountable difference in kind between the two institutions.
International trade and labour: a quest for moral legitimacy | Emerald Insight
Such an objection can be grounded as an article of faith among some political theorists. According to this, there is a fundamental difference between what Michael Oakeshott called enterprise and civil associa- tions. Instead, it provides the background against which such purposes are pursued by the enterprise association. The state properly exists to provide a framework of public order, and this framework could extend to include human rights. The reason is that on this analysis the latter are inherently unsuited to a civic role. From this perspective, the WTO or the commercial corporation cannot coherently see themselves as having a primary responsibility to further the full set of human rights with the range and balance that we have seen civic principles require.
That scope of commitment manifests a fundamental confusion between the logic of enterprise and civic association. If it is successful, collateralism is built into the fabric of globalisation — of that portion, that is, which has witnessed the transfer of power from states to international and domestic non-state actors. The question is, is it possible to bring collateral responsi- bilities for certain basic rights, such as access to health care in the case of the WTO, into the set of primary responsibilities of that body, and yet still 19 M Oakeshott, On Human Conduct Oxford, OUP, p ff.
Collateralism 63 not abandon the particular character of the institution? Is it, in short, fatal to an attempted transformation of priorities that the WTO could complain that it is being asked to duplicate the functions of the state in addition to its own? The answer is that it is possible to hold on to and to do justice to both of these elements that are pulling against one another.
It is possible, that is, that the WTO can carry on as an organisation with the particular role assigned to it of integrating markets, while at the same time having a responsibility to promote rights such as the right to health care. It might, in other words, reverse the direc- tion of compromise between basic rights. The reason for working with basic rights in this way is that it is also possible to reverse the order between general and special institutional objectives without sacrificing the identity of an organisation.